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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

EUGENE A. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 9396

vs.

KATHLEEN D. ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPE.LLANT
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING
TO DISQUALIFY ITSELF AFTER DEFENDANT
FILED AN AFFIDAVIT & MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE.
POINT II
THE COURT COMITTED ERROR IN CONSIDERING
THE MATTER OF REDUCTION OF SUPPORT
MONEY WHEN THE SAME WAS NOT IN ISSUE
AND AFTER PLAINTIFF HAD RESTED HIS CASE.
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POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REDUCING
THE EXISTING SUPPORT MONEY AWARD.
POINT IV
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING
COUNSEL FEES TO DEFENDANT AS A MATTER
OF LAW.
POINT V
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PEREMPTORILY AND WITHOUT HEARING, ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY COURT COSTS THERETOFORE
FILED IMPECUNIOUSLY.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ARGUMENT
P was awarded a divorce from D on January
8, 1959, (Ellett, Judge), and D was awarded $60 per
mo. support rnoney for each of two minor children
and possession of the family home, P to make the
monthly payment thereon of $62.50, and child support was ordered increased $62.50 per month if the
D remarried or vacated the~home (R32), D being
awarded the equity in the home accrued to date of
decree and denied alimony. P at the time of divorce
was earning $260 net per month at the Veterans'
Hospital (R40) and earning Army Reserve pay of $60
per quarter (R40 & T90), owed First Prudential in
excess of $100~ owed his Credit Union an unspecified sum, and allegedly owed his mother in excess
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of $3300 for a Pontiac station wagon the parties purchased new in 1955, furniture etc. (T90). The Court
made no finding concerning the validity or existence of this alleged debt.
D could not afford the utility bills to n1aintain
the home and petitioned the Court on Feb. 20, 1959,
for permission to move out and rent the home.
(R 24 to 26). At the hearing on this petition on March
23, 1959, the Court set her equity in the home at the
first $1000 of the proceeds of the sale of said home
and ordered P to pay $90 per mo. support per child
if the home was sold (R37).

P chose to buy the home and paid D $1000 for
her equity, which $1000 he claimed he first borrowed from his mother and then borrowed from
his credit union on or about April 14 1959, to repay
his mother. D moved out and went with the children to Las Vbgas on April 24, 1959 (Rl04) to seek
her former employment as a soda fountain girl at
the Stardust Hotel. On June 1, 1959, the Court entered an order that P pay the $90 bi-monthly support money to the clerk of the Court on the lOth and
25th days of each month (R98).
On Dec. 1, 1959, P filed a verified Motion (R60)
·praying that D be required to show cause why she
should not be permanently deprived of the custody
of· the two minor children in favor of P and release
P from making further support money payments
(R62), and an Order to Show Cause was issued
thereon. (R64).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
REFUSING TO DISQUALIFY ITSELF
AFTEFt DEFENDANT FILED AN AFFIDAVIT & MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE.
On Jan. 13, 1960, D filed an Affidavit and Motion
(R73-75) for the disqualification of the Han. Joseph
G. Jeppson, who as ex parte Judge had set the Order to Show Cause down for hearing before himself
as trial judge. The said judge denied this motion at
the time set for trial on Feb. 4, 1960, and proceeded
with the trial of the issues before the court. Judge
Jeppson at no time questioned the legal sufficienC),.
of the affida-vit, as he might have done.
The Court erred in not disqualifying itself. Said
Affidavit and Motion for Disqualification was made
under and pursuant to Rule 63(b) URCP, which
makes no provision for the judge sought to be disqualified, or for any judge, to weigh the merits of
the affidavit. It permits the judge challenged to
certify the affidavit to another judge solely to pass
upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. This Judge
.Jeppson did not do. Rule 63(b) is crystal-clear that
the judge sought to be disqualified shall be disqualified upon the filing of an affidavit for disqualification which he does not question. This appears a
proper and well-founded rule, for what greater proof
of the Court's animus could be found than such
Court's insistence on trying a challenged case.
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By the Court's refusal to -disqualify itself, the D
was denied a fair hearing and is entitled to a new
trial if t"he Court herein does not restore her to her
status quo and grant the relief she seeks herein.
0

0

0

Following the Court's refusal to disqualify itself, P put 011 evide11ce in -support a·£ his Motion to
deprive: D of custody, which ·Motion alleged that D
on Ju.ne 19", 1959, left the children with Mr. and Mrs.
Ralph D. Bellamy of Henderson, Nevada, agreeing
to -pay $120 per mo. for their care, but paid them
only $110 from then _until Sept. 11, 1959, altho P sent
D $180 per mo. for the children, because of which
and other alleged elemer1ts of neglect, the children
were taken into protective custody by the Las Vegas
Juvenile Court on Sept. 11, 1959, (P Motion at 60-63).
The Court duly found that P wilfully failed to
make the support money payments as ordered
(Rl04); that the July lOth and 25th payments· were
ndt made until August, and the D used this money
to -support the. children while she had them with
her from July 25, 1959, after her d:ischarge:from the
hospital and until Aug. 15, 1959 (Rl06), when she
went· to ·work, prematurely and returned the children:· ·to the Bellamys; ·that the August payments
were made late and did not reach the D until August
25, 1959·, at which time they were stolen thru no
fault of D· (Rl04); that Don Sept. 11 received the $90
Sept. lOth payment and gave Mr. Bellamy $50 of it
on Sept. 11; that Mr. Bellamy took the money and
then informed D the children were given . to the
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Juvenile Court that morning (R106); that the Bellamys
did not disclose to the Juvenile Court that the D had
the children with her at her own expense from July
26 to Aug. 15 or that she paid them said $50; that
the Juvenile Court took the children, believing the
Bellamys had not received money with which to
feed and care for the children and being unable
to contact the D (R106).
When P rested his case (T84), the Court asked,
"Mr. Clark, by way of evidence, what has she done,
just take the children?"
D, thru Miss Candas, answered, "Your Honor,
we have not presented our case. I have a witness
from the Welfare I would like to call now.''
Court: "I am asking Mr. Clark for a summation of what evidence he has to show the children
ought to be taken."
Following Mr. Clark's summation, the Court
found (T85) that on Sept. 11, 1959, when the children
were taken, the D was 4 $90 payments short, 2 payments being stolen and 2 payments being in the possession of the P and that the payments D had received had been paid to the Bellamys or used for
the support of the children when D had them with
her, whereupon the Court (T88) said P's Petition
for change of custody was denied and the Court
would not need any evidence (from D) on change of
custody.
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POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
CONSIDERING THE MATTER OF REDUCTION OF SUPPORT MONEY AT
THIS HEARING.
Following the Court's denying of P's Petition
for change of custody and altho P had rested his
case (T84) and the Court had disposed of all the issues presented and proved by the P, the Court at
T87 said, "What else do you ask in your petition
besides change of custody?" Mr. Clark took the bait
and answered, "We ask that the support money
payments be reduced to $100 per mo."
The Court then erroneously permitted P to present and seek a reduction in support money, despite
the fact that this was not an issue before the Court,
P in his Petition for OSC having prayed for the
custody of the children with attendant withdrawal
()f all support money from D and P nowhere having
framed an issue on a proper foundation alleging
substantial change of circumstances from the time
o£ the making of the original support order which
would justify a reduction. P's financial circumstances had theretofore been brought into the trial
by the D solely to prove that the P was able to pay
attorney's fees prayed and sought by the D in her
defense of -p's Petition and in the prosecution of her
counter-petition for P's wilful failure to make support money payments as ordered by the Court. The
Court erred in assuming the role of P's advocate
and instigating and permitting the raising of an isSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sue not raised by P in his pleadings or by his evidence.

POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
REDUCING THE EXISTING SUPPORT
MONEY AWARD.
The evidence clearly showed that there was
no substantial change -of either P or D's circumstances from the time Judge Ellett set the original
support money award, to justify a reduction thereof.
Certainly there was no improvement in D's finances
to warrant a reduction, as the Court (T93) prevented
D from putting on .preferred evidence of her impecuniosity and the reasons therefore by pronouncing that the Court would find from the evidence D had given that she was in need. The record
further shows that P's financial circumstances, far
from being worse than at the time Judge Ellett set
the support money, were, if· anything, bettered.
·Finding of Fact 6 (R40) of the final Findings,
Conclusions and Decree-- of Divorce, recite: ."P is
regularly employed by the Veterans' Hospital where
he earns $260 net monthly. P earns additional income every 3 months thru membership in the Army
Reserve". Said Army Reserve earnings were $60 per
quarter,· or $20 mo. (T90), and at said time of the divorce, P owed First Federal in excess of $100, was
indebted to his employees' credit union in an unspecified amount, was allegedly indebted to his
mother in excess of $3300, was paying $62.50 per mo.
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on the family home, and testified at that time that
his financial condition was 'very poor" (all at T90).
At this hearing, P admitted that his financial
position at the time of the divorce hearing was as
poor as he now claimed it to be (T90). Further evidence adduced was as follows: P borrowed $1000
from his mother to buy D's equity· in the family home
and repaid her by borrowing $1000 from his credit
union in April 1959. He had repaid $375 of the principal of this .loan plus interest .thereon from April
thru December 1959, from his Army Reserve earnings from July 1, 1959, to Dec. 31, 1959, being a summer camp pay in July of aproximately $185 (T44) and
earnings averaging $100 per quarter for the quarters ending Sept. 30, 1959, and Dec. 31, 1959 (T37).
This was a substantial improvement over the $60
per quarter reserve pay he was earning at the time
of the divorce. His hospital pay was unchanged
(T37). Altho he owed the credit union $625 (T42) of
the $1000 loan, he had acquired home-equity worth
at least. $1200 (T42). He no longer owed First Prudential the $100 debt he owed at the time of the
divorce, nor did he owe the credit union the indebtedness he owed at that time. And except for
allegedly owing his mother $4000 (T40) for the same
items for which he claimed he owed her in excess
of $3300 at the time of the divorce, his only other
debt was a $15 clothing bill owed to Mednick's
IT40).
P's house payment of $62.50 per month, including taxes and insurance, was covered by rental inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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come, P claiming he was able to get only $62.50 mo.
rent from a 2-bedroom, modern home because of
its state of disrepair when he leased it for a year to
the first prospects who appeared. To show his impoverished condition and inability to pay $90 per
child per mon.th support money, the P testified that
he had just expended $40 on his home a.nd that after
he rented it out in April 1959, he had repaired the
furnace, replaced lighting fixtures, linoleum and
bathroom fixtures and effected needed plumbing
repairs. However, the fact that he had money for
these improvements over and above the support
money payments which he had discharged in full
for the past ·year spoke eloquently of his ability to
continue paying the same amount of support, particularly since these improvements had eliminated
the state of disrepair of the home and paved the
way for P to increase the rent when the lease was
due to expire shortly after the hearing.
On the foregoing evidence, the Court (Tl02) ordered the support money reduced from $90 per halfmonth for the two minor children to $75 per halfmonth, and at Tl03, ordered the support money cut
to $60 per half-month whenever the children were
not in the State (of Utah) on the due date of any instalment.
Such reduction, the defendant contends, is
purely error, there being no substantial, or any,
change of circumstances to warrant a reduction of
the support money from the amount set by the Han.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. H. Ellett in the original instance. And no valid
reason, or any reaso11 whatsoever, exists to warrant
reducing the amount of support by an additional
$30 per month if the children reside elsewhere than
in Utah, there being no evidence anywhere that
the children would eat less, wear less clothing, require less medical or dental attention, get baby
tending care cheaper, or in any way require less for
their support, nurture and education out of the State
of Utah than they require in the State of Utah. Both
reductions appear clearly error.
The fact that P's circumstances were not substantially changed for the worse, to support a reduction of support, was proven by P's own admissions, T90:
Miss Candas:

Wasn't your financial position
then (at time of divorce) as
poor as you claim it is now.

Mr. Anderson:

Yes ma'am.

Miss Candas:

In other words, your financial
ability . . . is the same as it
was when the divorce trial
was held; is that correct?

Mr. Anderson:

I do owe more money from the
loans. The Credit Union is
More.

Miss Candas:

That is because you now own
the equity in the home the
Court awarded to your wife;
is that right?
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- Mr. Anderson: ·Yes ma'am.
Miss Candas:

·Other than that, is your financial condition the same as it
was in January 1959?

Mr. Anderson: . Pretty close to it, yes'm.

POINT N
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
DENYING COUNSEL FEES TO D IN
CONNECTION WITH THE PRESENTATION AND HEARING OF P'S PETITION
AND OSC PROCEEDINGS FOR RE. MOVAL OF CUSTODY FROM D AND
D'S COUNTERPETITION AND OSC
FOR CONTEMPT OF P FOR NONPAYMENT OF SUPPORT MONEY AS ORDERED, AND PROCEEDINGS, HEARINGS AND APPEARANCES INCIDENT
TO THE FOREGOING ISSUES.
The D prevailed in defending and defeating
P' s proceedings to remove custody of the children
from herself. She prevailed on her Counterpetition
to find P in contempt for nonpayment of support
payments on time and for not paying a $50 attorney's
fee awarded her a year previously, the Court finding (Tl03) the P guilty of contempt of Court for not
paying· the $50 attorney's fee and for not making
support payments on time and fining P $25 or 5 days
in the, county jail. Yet the Court denied D attorney'~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fees as a matter of law, under the :mistaken assumption of the_ C_ourt that a wife is entitled to attorney's
fees··qn1y ·where··she is aWarded a divorce/ on the
hu.sban.d's. .f~ult,·· ·and the Court therefore denied D
attorney's fees i~ .th~se proceedings because of the
fact that ~the original· 'clivorce herein was awarded
to the P.
-, i"'"·:--

.....~.·- ,- .. ,.,..,,,.. :·

The Court after ·: fnftfatihg a proceeding for P
to seelc a reduction ·in support money after P had
rested,, recess~d court' until 2 p.m~, arid the following transpired (T89):
·
··
THE COURT: The only question this afternoon
is whether the amount he is paying shall be reduced,
and whether he should· be put· in jail for contempt.
MISS CONDAS: . And attorneys fees on this
hearing.
THE COURT: On what basis would she have
a right to ask that? ·He got·the divorce. After she lost
the divorce case has she a right to come in for attorneys fees: - -· ~ ·
· · MISS CONDAS: · Of course, when he comes in
artd-·accuses-her and she prevails, she is entitled to
fees.
·.; : ·':· ··THE .COURT: ~.You can file a brief on that. Allowance of these. attorneys fees is only when she
is ·his wife and it is his fault, and the divorce failed.
That is not so ·in·this case. It is her fault. The Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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found against her.
MISS CONDAS: That is all in the past. We
don't make claim for that.
(Court in recess until2 o'clock P.M.)
At the commencement of court at 2 p.m., D's
counsel presented Utah cases where a former wife
was allowed attorney's fees in post-divorce hearings
brought or defended by the former wife involving
custody and support money matters. Unfortunately
the reporter has not given us the benefit of a transcript on this portion of the trial, but the Court's
comment to D's counsel following the presentation
of these cases was, "Was the husband awarded the
original divorce in the cases you have just cited?"
Counsel answered that the Supreme Court of Utah
in none of these cases made any mention as to who
was originally awarded the divorce because it made
no difference, the law being that the Court has the
discretionary power to award the former wife attorney's fees in such post-divorce matters regardless of who was awarded the original divorce. The
Court thereupon stated that it was not bound by the
cases cited, there being no proof that the husband
was originally awarded the divorce in the cases
cited by D's counsel, and that D was denied attorneys fees as a matter of law. But the Court did
not have the courage of its convictions when it came
to signing a Finding of Fact that D was denied attorneys fees as a matter of law (emphasis ours). The
Court directed Miss Candas to prepare the final OrSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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der and submit a copy to Mr. Clark two days before
the Order was submitted for signature (Tl03). Miss
Candas did this, the Findings of Fact reciting, among
other things, that D was denied attorneys fees as a
matter of law. Mr. Clark approved the entire Findings, Conclusions and Decree as submitted, because
they reflected the record accurately. But the Court,
doubtless observing that the Findings were prepared by Miss Candas with an eye to perfecting a
record for appeal, called Mr. Clark in secretly, without notice to D's counsel, and instructed Mr. Clark
to prepare different Findings, as directed by the
Court. The original Findings were suppressed and
nowhere appear in the record. The Amended Findings prepared under the Court's direction significantly omit the st(itement that D was denied attorney's fees "as a matter of law". The Court's motive
and animus towards D or her counsel becomes yet
more clear by this surreptitious incident. The Court,
however, could. not obliterate from the transcript
its foregoing exchange with counsel which expressed the Court's thinking and ruling that the
issue was treated and disposed of as a law question
and not one of legal discretion (T89).
D claims it is manifest error for the Court to
deny D counsel fees herein as a matter of law, the
law in this state being so well-settled and clear that
it lies within the sound discretion of the court to
award a former wife attorney's fees in post-divorce
hearing of the instant type, that the writer will not
belabor the court with a citation of the numerous
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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decisions of this ·cou"rt, arid· other: courtsj ·reiterating
this well-settled principle of law.

POINT V
THE COURT.. COMMITTED ERROR IN·
.. · PEREMPTORILY ORQERING ._D.- .TO. ...
..PAY COURT. COSTS _TBERETOFORE :-.FILED IMPECUNIOUSLY BY D WITHOUT GRANTING DEFENDANT . A.
HEARING.
The Court, without giving D any opportunity
to explain what disposition she. made of the $1000
she received from P for her equity in the home or
opportunity to justify her not having paid court costs
theretofore filed impecuniously by her, took it upon
itself to order her to pay the costs incurred by her
and not paid and gave D 30 days in which to get
them paid, as follows (Tl02):
. THE. COURT: · The _D in this _:rp9.tter _has: some
c6urt costs I. think· have 'not· been pai.d. She signed
some imp~cunious .affidavit~, did she not?" • . . IT
IS ORDERED that the D pay th~ costs that she .hasincurre·d and has nQt paid, based on affidavits of
impecuniosity. She receiveq_ $1000 in this matter 9-nd
has not paid those costs. The Court requires them
to be paid. You will be given 30 ·days in which to
get ·them paid, and· that will be part of this order
that the Court will expect· you to draw, Mlss
Condas."
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Such matter was -n6t before the Court, there
was no evidence to justify the ~ourt finding -that
the defendant had the ability to pay such costs or
that she had wilfully or contemptuously failed to
pay them, but the Court tried and sentenced her
without any accusation, indictment or charge
brought against her and without any hear_ing on a
feigned charge, all of which the defendant submits
is clearly error and gives support to the allegations
of prejudice of this Court whom the D sought to
disqualify for these very iniquities and inequities
by which D could not and was not afforded a fair
trial.
CONCLUSION
The legal principles herein relied upon are so
well-established that the writer has not burdened
the Court with the citing of the many cases in support of these principles. The points raised in this
appeal are likewise so simple that counsel was loath
to tax this deliberate body with primer problems.
However, counsel has an ethical duty even to impecuniotls clients and must attempt to U:i'1ravel injustice when it oppresses the weak and the poor.
The cost of litigation makes justice oftentimes the
luxury of the rich, and it becomes the. lot of lawyers,
the first and last defenders of our freedoms, to fight
to preserve justice in its sanctuary, the courts .
The record, comwencing with .the Court's ·advising counsel at2 p.rh. of December 18, 1959, that
it was vacating its previous order ·of continuance
and commanding counsel to be present for hearing
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at .2:30 p.m. that day, with or without her client, und_er penalty_of a $150 fine for_ contempt, shows_thruout. the biq.s and _ prejudtce o:f the Court to- counsel
and D, all as more fully set forth in D's Affidavit for
Disqualification (R73). The Court's tactical advantage
given to the other side in deliberately reopening the
P's case and permitting unpleadissues to be presented and favorably passed·_ upon, gave -P an undue
a-dvantage, denied. D the opportunity of a fair trial
and militatecf to the -·detrim-ent- 'of the 'advocate
system which is the bulwark of our~ judiciaf system.
-

The Court's refusal to apply the law to the facts
as stated from P's own mouth - that P's financial
circumstances upon- which J~dge Ellett determined
the original -suport- money award were unchanged;
its dismissing lightly the many cases demarcing a
f()rmer wife's right to counsel fees in custody and
support cases as enunciated clearly by this Courtvividly illustrate that the Court thruout indulged its
wont and whim, with scant attention to the law and
substantial justice. In the only instance where· the
Court ruled favorably to the D, P's own evidence
plied guilt. and' .blame upon. the· p with every blow
lie· ostensibly struck at D,- and the Court scarcely
coulq and d1d not permit P to place his wrongdoing
'at: D's- door. ~
,
- . . .. - -Other tha-n. this portion. of the decree, the remaining pronouncements of. the Court cannot be
accepted' permitted 'to 'stand in the light of logic
and the law. If the public is to preserve its faith in
011r court system, if ·we are to continue to believe
that it is the function and province and duty of our

or'
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courts to dispense free and dispassionate justice,
then courts must zealously be everwatchful to do
noting calculated or tending to impair that sanctity
vested in our courts.
The law is the noblest achievement of mankind.
Courts must therefore remain above suspicion and
reproach. To do otherwise destroys the public trust
and destroys the factor that is the substance which
gives validity and meaning to a system of law.
Courts may not debase the law and reduce it from
the level of the forum to the petty level of the market. place. The Court could not refuse to accede to an
:'''affidavit challenging his impartiality because he
thereby acknowledged to the world the presence of
his prejudice by insisting on holding tight to the
reins of litigation to work mischief upon the case. To
permit such determination to stand impairs confidence in the integrity of our courts, and the impregnable, vaunted majesty of our courts which so proudly we hail is assaulted by the countenancing of such
a Vendetta.
The D should be granted a new impartial trial
unless the Court herein restores the original support award and affirms D's right to counsel fees.
Thus only can the mischief be undone and rebuke
and warning be sounded before the bell tolls for
justice as we humbly believe it exists.
Respectfully submitted,
MARY CONDAS LEHMER
Counsel for Appellant
410 Empire Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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